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The significance of formal criteria which could help to sort out the problem 
of tolerance paradox has emerged in the background of cultural egalitarian-
ism. Alas, such criteria have not been established so far. The conviction that 
the problem of tolerance is significant just in the context of social and political 
discourse might be questioned due to the fact that this attitude did not help to 
tackle this problem throughout the last centuries. The paper aims to show that 
the problem of tolerance can be solved taking into account systemic attitude 
and synergetic insights. The current study into the literature on tolerance con-
cludes that the formal criterion, which defines the tolerance boundaries in the 
most general sense, is considered to be such deviations from the standard (as 
ideal parameters of social system) when tolerance can function normally (sta-
bly). Cultural egalitarianism, which requires equalizing the rights of the major-
ity and the minorities facing discrimination, impinges on the ratio of necessary 
diversity, and thus has to be questioned. 




At the dawn of the new millennium (on 6–9 September 2000), the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted United Nations Millennium Declaration, which encourag-
es people and governments of the world to promote creation of peace culture based on 
tolerance and respect to each other. Different declarations, however, may just remain 
an expression of good will and strivings. Neither the number of war and political con-
flicts has decreased, nor tolerance increased. Alas, new serious problems of tolerance 
and discrimination have emerged. For instance, BNS agency has presented informa-
tion, concerning political scandal which was caused by Rocco Buttinglione, the Ital-
ian politician nominated to the post of Justice Minister of the European Union (EU), 
who said that “children who have just mother but not father are the children of mother 
who is not very good” (Lietuvos žinios, 18 October, 2004, Issue 242). The reaction to 
this assertion was immediate (as well as to his previous statement that homosexual-
ity is a sin) – the Italian politician’s nomination was not only derailed but also he was 
evaluated as the embodiment of intolerance. 
This political conflict is symptomatic: the politicians of the EU who declare toler-
ance towards diversity of beliefs turned out to be extremely intolerant towards the 
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Catholic attitude to family. It cuts both ways: having accused the Italian Catholic poli-
tician of intolerance towards single mothers and sexual minorities, they demonstrated 
their intolerance towards intolerance.
This recurrent phenomenon is closely related to the paradox of intolerance and to 
the attempt of modern liberalism to exercise cultural egalitarianism (when the rights 
of the majority and minorities are being equalized). The tendency of cultural egalitari-
anism has already reached Lithuania. The media abounds in extensive discussions on 
the newly adopted law by the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) on Protection of Minors 
against the Detrimental Effect of Public Information (Valstybės žinios, 2009 Issue: 
86-3637). Both the proponents of traditional values and their opponents accuse each 
other of being intolerant. It appears utterly impossible to envisage logic and under-
standing of tolerance essence behind these emotional accusations. Thus, the relevance 
of tolerance problem is indubitable. Although the tolerance boundaries have been 
discussed for centuries, they have not been adequately and clearly defined even in 
theoretical works (which, however, do not distinguish in being abundant, especially in 
Lithuania). 
This paper aims at answering two questions: a) Is it possible to propose such defi-
nition of tolerance boundaries which could be reasonably objective (intersubjective)?
b) Is cultural egalitarianism truly useful to society? The widely spread belief that the 
problem of tolerance is significant just in the contexts of social and political discourse 
was one more underlying reason to resume writing this paper. Thus, the paper sets out 
to show that another point of view is possible, and the latter objective is accomplished 
through scientific literature exploration employing neoreductionist methodology. 
The conception of tolerance as a social and political phenomenon
The most general meaning of the word tolerance is willingness to accept anything 
what is not acceptable to a person or social groups (to accept various opinions, atti-
tudes or behaviour, i.e. the otherness, that you may not agree with and what is evalu-
ated negatively). The origin of this word is from the Old Greek word talao, which 
means endure, survive while the word tolerantia means patience. Tolerance is also 
perceived as a voluntary decision not to oppose and endure what is evaluated as being 
negative (Plečkaitis 1998: 7, 47), or resignation with attitudes which we do not like or 
even think them being harmful (Legutko 2006: 7). 
Catriona McKinnon (McKinnon 2006: 14–15) presents six structural features of 
tolerance which, as she points out, most theorists basically agree with:
1. Difference: what is tolerated differs from the tolerator’s conception of what 
should be done, valued, or believed;
2. Importance: what is tolerated by the tolerator is not trivial to her;
3. Opposition: the tolerator disapproves of and/or dislikes what she tolerates and is 
ipso facto disposed to act so as to alter or suppress what is tolerated; 
4. Power: the tolerator believes herself to have the power to alter or suppress what 
is tolerated;
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5. Non–rejection: the tolerator does not exercise this power;
6. Requirement: toleration is right and/or expedient, and the tolerator is virtuous, 
and/or just, and/or prudent. 
The author maintains that tolerance is possible just in case when a situation can 
be described using the first four features of tolerance. Moreover, she differentiates 
between two interpretations of a person who is supposed to be tolerant – the weak 
and the strong. The basic difference between the two interpretations lies in the fact 
that the first one implies intolerance as a possibility to create conditions for tolerance 
while the latter rejects that; therefore, the weak interpretation may give rise to further 
restrictions of tolerance (McKinnon 2006: 18–27). 
According to Andrew Fiala (Fiala 2005: 1–2), the Western culture comprehends 
tolerance as a certain political principle, whereas in the earlier times the ancient 
Greeks, for instance, associated tolerance just with an individual’s ethical life. And 
yet, current political discourse puts great emphasis on the integration of marginalized 
minorities into society but not on the problem of their toleration. However, the process 
of integration is impossible without tolerance.
If we comprehend tolerance as reconciliation with attitudes which we do not jus-
tify and even consider them harmful, it might be interpreted as a kind of coercion on 
ourselves (Spieß 2003). Indeed, it is difficult to make yourself not to react to some-
thing that seems inappropriate and even harmful. Is it possible to bring oneself to 
tolerate violence or slaughter? But it is often tolerated. What I mean is that repressive 
structures existing in any country or wars are being, however, tolerated. Apparently, 
Ryszard Legutko must be right claiming that the concept of tolerance has always im-
plied something mysterious and it is not sensible to refer to it in terms of an independ-
ent category. Moreover, it cannot be independent since it has always been related to 
essential moral and political concepts (Legutko 2006: 7–8). Therefore, it is not ac-
cidental that John Locke, who proclaimed his famous “Letter on Tolerance” (Laffitte 
2009) in 1688, is considered to be the founding father of modern tolerance and liberal 
ideology. The most prominent theorist of new liberalism John Rawls did not attempt 
to hide that his theory of justice as fairness is nothing more that Locke’s theory of 
social agreement just being raised to a higher degree of abstraction (Baranova 2004: 
280). Rawls’ conviction that material inequality existing in real societies has to be 
regulated the way it could serve the people of inferior position has been adopted in 
the view that moral inequality has also to be regulated. First of all, social and moral 
discrimination against gender and sexual minorities is implied here. Namely, such 
discrimination was envisaged in Buttinglione’s statements by the EU politicians who 
grounded their indignation on new liberalism. The new liberal practice might be in-
terpreted as follows: single mothers and homosexuals are regarded to be in inferior 
position, thus it is necessary to safeguard their rights. This practice and its theoretical 
assumptions were accurately described by Algirdas Degutis: “If we allow the rights of 
minorities to penetrate our society, they will devour the usual freedoms of people. [...] 
Despite the country’s ‘equal’ care of everyone’s interests [...], having acknowledged 
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the rights of discriminated minorities, it (the country) has to enforce aggressive dis-
criminatory policy towards the society” (Degutis 2009). 
This “discriminatory struggle against discrimination”, as Degutis qualified de-
structive antagonism of liberal tolerance towards traditional values, is closely related 
to the so called paradox of tolerance: if we logically develop the theory of cultural 
egalitarianism (the equalization of the majority and minority rights), we give rise to 
inevitable controversies. Due to its consistent development, “liberal emancipation” 
seems to be completed just when human rights are equalized to the rights of worms or 
minerals (Degutis 2009). 
The problem of tolerance boundaries
The tolerance paradox implies an idea that unlimited tolerance contradicts itself, thus 
it has to be bounded (Plečkaitis 1998: 186), i.e. we have to be intolerant to some ex-
pressions of tolerance. According to Legutko, who studied the history of tolerance, 
this idea was fully grasped by the first participants in the argument on tolerance. Even 
Locke, who disseminated the necessity of tolerance, understood that even cognitive 
egalitarianism is impossible (Legutko 2006: 111–112). Therefore, he accepted the idea 
that the object of tolerance is just “neutral things”, and it was decided that tolerance is 
not related to what is morally bad, harmful or villainous, thus we can argue just about 
what is in the “middle” (Legutko 2006: 24). 
This agreement has not, however, solved the problem because we always question 
what is good or bad, useful or harmful. Since Socrates’ times up to now, moral phi-
losophers have been arguing about the basic notions of morality (see Baranova 2004). 
The problem of tolerance is not only political problem but also the problem of moral 
philosophy. This is due to the fact that the morality paradox, as Legutko points out, 
possesses two aspects: the principle of tolerance starts contradicting both political 
principle, which requires to adopt more general attitudes and neutralize the phenom-
ena that may pose danger to the oneness of society, and intellectual principle, which 
demands to seek what is good and right (Legutko 2006: 7). 
  Taking into account that Rawls considered political philosophy inherent in moral 
philosophy (Miniotaitė 1988), it becomes evident that both principles are interrelated, 
thus in the context of the tolerance paradox this correlation could be named as the 
ratio problem of mercy (tolerance) and being principled (intolerance), which some-
times is called as the problem of intolerance to intolerance (Sprindžiūnas 2004). The 
above mentioned intolerant evaluation of Rocco Buttinglione’s intolerance is a classi-
cal example illustrating this phenomenon. It may be related to applying double stand-
ards to evaluation of the same phenomena, i.e. moral relativism. Intolerance towards 
intole-rance of others becomes tolerance towards your own intolerance. Different 
political attitudes which are distanced from moral decisions and legitimized by lobby-
ing activities become ultimately decisive. 
Usually it is emphasized that we can trace philosophical roots of intolerance in 
Plato’s The State (Fiala 2005: 177), that we cannot discuss the problem of intolerance 
separately from other fundamental philosophical problems (Legutko 2006: 8), that 
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this problem is primarily related to axiological problems (Plečkaitis 1998: 82) and that 
we can discuss the problem just at the level of conscience but not of cognition (Spieß 
2003). Jürgen Spieß illustrates the latter claim by saying that there are some people 
who believe that two plus three is six. However, he doubts whether we appear toler-
ant if we allow such people to build bridges and buildings. Furthermore, he questions 
the essence of tolerance if we do not say that a person is wrong. A similar position is 
maintained by McKinnon (McKinnon 2006: 9), who claims that tolerance is by no 
means incompatible with a belief that making two plus two equals five. This view can 
be paraphrased in the following way: there and then, where and when a clear and pre-
cise decision is necessary, it is impossible to speak about tolerance towards mistakes 
and fallacies. This idea will be discussed further since it tends to be true just under 
certain conditions. 
While summarizing the study of tolerance concept, Legutko (Legutko 2006: 244–
245) concludes that nowadays the tolerance concept has little to do with the processes 
of forming social peace, whereas contemporary philosophers and politicians tend to 
focus on the autonomy of an individual and pluralism of values in the first place; 
thus making them the basis of social order and peace. Hence, the tolerance paradox 
of tolerance remains not taken into consideration. According to Romanas Plečkaitis 
(Plečkaitis 1998: 200), this happens due to the fact that theoretically the problem of 
establishing the tolerance boundaries is not so complex since we have documented 
human rights and we share universal values. To make it more understandable, it seems 
that the paradox of tolerance is often ignored just because the tolerance boundaries 
have been precisely defined in international declarations (e.g. Human Rights), conven-
tions and laws. 
However, we can hardly consider documented human rights as a theory; it is rather 
a general political agreement. Apparently, we can doubt the existence of universal 
values, i.e. we can doubt if these values are acknowledged and willingly accepted by 
all people. The pluralism of values is increasingly becoming the only value in modern 
society. 
Despite this, I believe that such universal values still exist. Many great thinkers 
referred to them throughout the centuries. Although their gradations of values differ 
somewhat, all of them underline that orientation to them gives meaning and value to 
the human entity. I argue that only the orientation to the highest values conveys genu-
ine sense of tolerance. Yet, some people think that such belief is speculative; rather, it 
is more an expression of feelings than reason. Thus, the problem of tolerance bounda-
ries will be further explored by offering rational arguments. 
The ways to formalize the tolerance boundaries
Plečkaitis (Plečkaitis 1998: 72–90) presents six ways of tolerance reasoning: pseudo-
reasoning, ontic and cognitive, axiological, biological, logical and social. Although 
each of them, excluding the first one, has its own pros and cons, neither of them can ex-
plain the paradox of tolerance. In order to solve it, Plečkaitis (Plečkaitis 1998: 251–257) 
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suggests that the principle of tolerance is best explored by employing the tools of lim-
ited logical formalization. This method implies the reduction of notions used in the hu-
manities and social sciences into abstract symbols and their further logical analysis. 
In addition to logical formalization, there are other ways to solve the tolerance par-
adox. Also, mathematical formalization (mathematical modelling) can be employed 
and is employed. Although the application of mathematical models in social sciences 
became possible just after high-powered computers were created and when it was re-
alized that social processes are possible to describe using non linear equations, nowa-
days some other results were achieved as well. For instance, mathematical models are 
employed to describe not only the development of political parties (Pyragas 2003: 60–
62) but also a well known love story of Romeo and Juliet (Pyragas 2003: 143–145). 
Highly abstract synergetic methods are encroaching on such subtle spheres of life 
as human psyche. A perfect example of it is a work devoted to general and social psy-
chology where you will not find anything except solutions of mathematical equations 
and conclusions (Мированов 2005). 
Nevertheless, the intervention of natural and mathematical sciences into the hu-
manities and social sciences is being questioned by both the humanity scholars and 
natural scientists. The concept of tolerance first correlates with human relations, eval-
uations, moral attitudes; thus it is assumed that we can discuss tolerance just at the 
level of conscience but not of cognition. In terms of science philosophy, there is a 
belief that to reduce the problems of tolerance to natural science cognition is not only 
meaningless but also impossible, whereas in terms of moral philosophy, there is a 
belief that if we do that, we commit a naturalistic fallacy. Therefore, even tentative 
attempts to view the problems of the humanities and social sciences from the natural 
science positions encou-nter substantial resistance or more often they are ignored. 
Yet, the extreme positions of antireductionists have been decreasing due to the fact 
that a new type of reductionism called neoreductionism (Kanišauskas 2003: 149–150) 
has emerged lately. It comprises two ideas: a) the whole consists of reciprocally inter-
relating parts which produce new qualities and which in turn are not reduced in the 
former qualities but they are described by universal laws (John T. Werle); b) we can 
reduce theories but not the laws or their conclusions (L. G. Bazhenov).
The first serious step towards the unification of the humanities and social sciences 
(or at least dissolving their basic contradictions) is considered Ludwig von Bertalaffy’s 
General System Theory (GST) published in 1968. It focuses on the ratio between the 
whole and part, system structures and functions, their environment and development, 
and, finally, the interaction between the systems and their elements (Seppanen 1998: 
191–196). Von Bertalaffy maintained that despite their significant achievements, nei-
ther physics nor chemistry or biology is able to account for the phenomenon of life 
and mind, even if they conflated their researches and achievements into the whole 
(an antireductionist attitude). But if we realized that the whole combined of elements 
means something more than just a sum these elements, we could trespass the bounda-
ries which differentiate between “the inanimate” and animate nature (a reduction-
ist attitude). GST was successfully developed by Mihajlo D. Mesarović who formu-
lated the notion of hierarchically subordinated systems and showed that the system 
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hierarchy occurs either because of interactions of homogeneous or heterogeneous sys-
tem components or during the process of dynamic self-organization (Sepannen 1998: 
196–197).
The term of self-organization was first introduced by a British engineer and one of 
the founding fathers of cybernetics W. Ross Ashby in 1947. Although the law called 
by his name will be discussed further, it is felt necessary to underline that the ba-
sic principles of cybernetics (as well as GST) were introduced into synergetics which 
is sometimes identified with the theory of self-organization, related to the theories 
of catastrophes, chaos, fractals and autopoiesis while in the USA it is known under 
the name of complexity theory. Since the fundamentals of synergetics and its implied 
principles were discussed earlier (Kanišauskas 2008), here just the issues important to 
establishing the tolerance boundaries are explored.
Although the above mentioned Werle’s neoreductionist attitude is primarily based 
on GST statement that it is impossible to know the whole if we do not know its ele-
ments (a reductionist attitude), it is necessary to realize that due to the interaction 
of elements forming the whole, the whole is basically (qualitatively) differs not only 
from its separate elements but also from their arithmetic sum (an antireductionist
attitude). The possibility to explore the whole which is qualitatively different from 
its constituent elements lies in the possibility (taking into account the subordination 
“rules” of hierarchical structures) to explore essential interactions of elements form-
ing the whole. Though it is impossible to thoroughly explore all interactions of system 
elements because of abundance of elements and relations, the phenomenon of mode-
locking observed in synergetics allows detecting such system elements which become 
non-abundant management parameters, which in their turn determine the emergent 
formation of new qualities and hierarchical levels (Kanišauskas 2008: 78–100).
The subordination “rules” of hierarchical structures are rather simple: a) every 
higher hierarchical structure is energetically supported by the lower; b) every higher 
hierarchical structure influences, directs and manages the actions of the lower; c) a 
system as the whole determines the action of all its elements. The latter idea devel-
oped in neurophysiology was called downward causation (Hulswit 2005). In physics, 
it is known as Mach’s principle.
It is of utmost importance to note that management parameters are closely con-
nected with topological organization of systems which is the same as information 
about the basic system structures (Kanišauskas 2008: 84) or, as Margaret J. Wheatley 
pointed out, “an organization of immaterial power” (Wheatley 1999: 54). Thus, even 
inanimate complex systems are managed not by harsh physical power but by infor-
mational processes. This helps to render one of the most fundamental propositions 
of synergetics which allows bridging the spheres of the humanities and social sci-
ences and which allows reducing the natural science theories to the spheres of the 
humanities and social sciences (neoreductionism). Cross-disciplinary approach which 
emerged at the end of the 20th century implies active interaction of different scientific 
approaches due to which other forms (every day, religious, esoteric, etc) of rational 
experience occurred (Киященко 2005), and all this has to be treated as an outcome of 
neo-reductionist attitudes. 
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The fact that neoreductionist attitudes have been actively penetrating into life may 
be supported by an increasing number of publications in the humanities and social 
sciences (Allen 2006; Chia 2006; Cilliers 2005; MacIntosh et al. 2005; Hesse-Biber, 
Leavy 2006; Ельчанов 2005; Хиценко 2005). This gives hope to solve the problem 
of tolerance boundaries applying neoreductionist methodology, more precisely, rather 
formal methods of socio-synergetics. Socio-synergetics or social synergetics is a new-
ly coined term implying the importance of penetration of synergetic methods, laws 
and thinking into social sciences. It is being taught at some universities in Russia 
(Ельчанов 2005).
Tolerance boundaries in the view of socio-synergetics
To establish a formal criterion which allows defining the tolerance is possible just in 
case we find the most essential idea implied in the usage of this concept. Taking into 
consideration that the concept of tolerance is first of all associated with individuals 
and their groups’ mutual relations and values, we should not forget that intellectual 
and material artefacts and the organism’s tolerance to physical and mental interven-
tions are evaluated (at the same time, they are tolerated or not tolerated). Although 
there is a view that in these cases the concept of tolerance is used as metaphor and 
thus we cannot apply such usage to human relations, it was proved earlier (Lakoff, 
Johnson 1999) that all abstract conceptions and terms used in science and philosophy 
are metaphorical in their nature. Moreover, metaphor being the product of thinking 
provides in-depth understanding of differrent concepts. Hence, the search of figura-
tive meanings in tolerance concept is advantageous in human relations analysis. 
As a medical term, the word tolerance implies the ability to tolerate different med-
icine dosages, suffer pain, difficult conditions without being harmed. As a financial 
term, it indicates inevitable allowed digression of coin weight from the established 
parameters defined by the law. In logic and science methodology, tolerance is defined 
as a methodological principle which emphasizes a possibility to express problems in 
different logical systems and recommends using conventions instead of prohibitions 
(Plečkaitis 1998: 7–10). In technical and other measurements, tolerance is viewed as 
the amount by which the measurement of a value can vary without causing problems; 
the less the tolerance, the more reliable, accurate the equipment or product is. The lat-
ter understanding of tolerance is explicated into the tolerance of dimension and form, 
though both of them are primarily based on the requirement to compare the ideal di-
mensions or forms with allowed digressions (Žuravliovas 1980). 
From the analysis of the mentioned concepts of tolerance, it becomes obvious 
that all of them imply the notion of tolerance boundaries as a norm or moderation.
Apparently, it becomes the most distinguishing in technical measurements: only these 
deviations from ideal parameters of each system can be tolerated which do not inter-
fere with normal (stable) functioning of this system. 
This view incorporates two significant aspects: a) neither in theory nor in practice, 
ideal precision and system functioning is possible, thus we have to tolerate deviations 
75LIMES, 2010, Vol. 3, No. 1: 67–79
from norms which are perceived as ideal parameters of a system; b) however, we can 
tolerate only those deviations which do not interfere with normal (stable) functioning
of this system. 
This understanding of the concept of tolerance is rather universal and it tends to 
reveal the essence of it in the most precise way. If we apply it to medicine, psychiatry, 
immunology, such drugs, physical and mental interventions which are not harmful to 
the body and mind’s stability and which are directed at enhancing stability are con-
sidered as being tolerated. If we apply that to the sphere of logics and terminology, 
such logical constructions and terms which allow stable functioning of logical and 
linguistic systems are considered as being tolerated. If we apply this abstract concept 
of tolerance to social, political, moral, religious and ecological spheres, the following 
issues are being tolerated: a) such social, political systems and ideologies that do not 
threaten the present social and political stability and harmony of society functioning; 
b) such moral views and actions inspired by them which do not destroy the existent 
relations in a family, among relatives or colleagues; c) such religious beliefs which do 
not violate the prevailing theological and dogmatic system and its harmony; d) such 
actions which do not destroy the existent ecological systems, their harmony and does 
not undermine their stability. 
Hence, it is obvious that tolerance boundaries can be defined in terms of existent 
stability and functional harmony of any system (natural, social, the humanities), and 
this can be considered to be a formal criterion of tolerance boundaries. 
This proposition can be undermined by the idea that if we do not tolerate funda-
mental changes and try to preserve the same status and order, the society might find 
itself in stagnation. To simplify, if a society strived just to maintain the existent stabil-
ity, it would stuck in its own development. This definition of tolerance boundaries is 
in direct contradiction to the famous Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety stating that 
“Variety absorbs variety”. An application of this law to society implies that a society 
has to be diverse (it is an essential prerequisite for its survival), thus it needs geniuses 
and lunatics, altruists and egoists, religious and agnostic people, the rich and the poor, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, tolerant and intolerant people, etc. The source of real-
ity development consists of oppositions based on variety. Therefore, any boundaries 
and prohibitions of otherness are at least tentative. 
  Alas, the latter claim is also questionable since Ashby’s law implies the idea 
of necessary disharmony: a certain disarray and disharmony has to exist in order 
to maintain variety. It was pointed up by Aleksej A. Davydov, a Russian sociolo-
gist working in the sphere of socio-synergetics. Having based his “systemic sociol-
ogy” on GST and synergetics (Давыдов 2006: 6–8), he refers to the works of the 
famous American sociologist and Pitirim Sorokin and asserts that social systems are 
not unique because they obey the same general systemic regularities, and 96% of our 
behaviour is determined by self-organizing processes directed at preserving stability.
In order to preserve variety and harmony (stability) in a constantly changing society 
and its relations, a certain disharmony is required. The harmony of social relations is 
best described by the Fibonacci numbers and “Golden section” which defines prevailing 
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proportions in nature. Davydov’s calculations based on these proportions indicate that 
the required disharmony constant, which ensures harmony and variety (the natural 
development at the same time), is 6%. It means that to ensure the stability of natural 
and social systems’ own development, about 6% of deviations from its parameters 
guaranteeing absolute stability is a prerequisite. It is noteworthy that Davydov inves-
tigated just these structural and functional parameters of society which are ascribed 
to the parameters of order or management. Empirical data slightly differ from theory 
data (6.33%) but the tolerated error (0.498%) indicates that practically they correspond 
to the theoretical ones (Давыдов 1994: 126–129). Considerable deviations (to one or 
another side) of management parameters from necessary disharmony constant indi-
cate not only disorder of stable functioning of social system but also they may become 
the cause of radical changes or even destroy the whole system.
The necessary prerequisite of a normal society is existence of different minorities,
a wide range of different attitudes and behaviour; but if their ratio (relation to the 
whole) significantly deviates to one or another side from necessary disharmony con-
stant, the society as a system (or its elements) would undergo a threat to be completely 
destroyed. Thus, the society or individuals (consciously or unconsciously) behave in 
the way they could preserve dynamic stability and this behaviour can be described as 
natural. They genuinely resist everything what destroys the harmony of the society in 
the same way as deviations from this harmony are naturally tolerated. Hence, such 
natural beha-viour is called as being self-organizing. It is concluded that the tolerance 
boundaries are likely to be defined by applying the necessary disharmony constant.
Tolerance and cultural egalitarianism
The view proposed by cultural egalitarianism that it is necessary to equalize the rights 
of the majority and discriminated minorities seems to be tentative if we refer to the 
above described notion of tolerance boundaries. However, the view that it is necessary 
to discuss tolerance in terms of conscience but not knowledge and that the proposition 
“two plus two equals five” is impossible to tolerate has to be examined first. 
On the contrary, the proposition “two plus two equals five” is not only tolerated 
but it also reveals the essence of non-linear processes (of necessary disharmony at the 
same time). Qualitative development (to the “better” or “worse” direction) is possible 
just in case of high degree of instability, whereas the “common sense” does not exist 
at that time. The butterfly effect occurs when even deteriorating little impact or inner 
changes may cause a catastrophe. This could result in the earlier mentioned social 
system deterioration or its transfer to a new development attractor. In other words, it 
means that if the completely destabilized system does not deteriorate, an inner “muta-
tion” or radical qualitative change occurs within it, and the latter does not have much 
in common with the previous state. The destabilization norm is defined by the neces-
sary disharmony constant. Although we can be tentative towards its preciseness or 
its methodological validity, not the numerical meaning of the constant is important 
but the fact that destabilized norm result in non-linear processes and the logic that 
“two plus two equals four” becomes irrelevant and everything that existed inevitably 
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deteriorates or changes radically. The changes are so radical that they differ signifi-
cantly from the previous states. 
Apparently, it is not the conscience which let us know that the violation of norms 
is tolerated just within limited boundaries but our innate sense of self-defence. The 
conscience “operates” within the sphere of tolerance features named by McKinnon, 
and the sense of self-defence enables us to question what might happen if the rights of 
sexual minorities were equalled with the rights sexual majority; and due to this, the 
ratio of sexual minorities and majority would deviate from the necessary disharmony 
constant. Vegetation is not the way how people breed. Thus, does Buttinglione’s con-
cern seem not being worth of attention?
Although this question is rhetorical, we can see deeper implications and an answer 
to the question whether cultural egalitarianism is useful to the society. The above pre-
sented arguments indicate that the requirement to equalize the moral rights of minori-
ties with the rights of majority sounds fairly dangerous because it interferes with the 
proportions of necessary variety. 
Conclusions
The most general formal criterion defining the tolerance boundaries is the deviations 
from the norm as ideal system parameters under which the system can continue its 
normal (stable) functioning. This proposition also applies to social sciences.
Deviations from the norm are a necessary condition of society development and 
they are defined by necessary disharmony constant. Small deviations from this con-
stant encourage social developmental changes and allow the society to remain rela-
tively stable. Thus, small deviations within tolerance boundaries are both encouraged 
and necessary. 
All behaviour and intentions which encourage large deviations from the constant 
are considered not tolerated. Cultural egalitarianism ideas are likely to have nothing 
to do with tolerance because they destroy the foundations of human existence. 
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Formalių kriterijų, kurie leistų spręsti tolerancijos paradokso problemą, svar-
ba išryškėjo kultūrinio egalitarizmo akivaizdoje. Tokių kriterijų nėra iki šiol. 
Įsitikinimas, kad tolerancijos problema prasminga tik socialinio ir politinio dis-
kurso kontekste, gali būti kvestionuojamas vien todėl, kad per kelis šimtmečius 
ši nuostata problemos išspręsti nepadėjo. Straipsnyje parodoma, kad toleranci-
jos problemą galima spręsti sisteminiu požiūriu ir sociosinergetikos įžvalgomis. 
Tolerancijai skirtos literatūros analizė leidžia daryti išvadą, kad bendriausiu 
atveju tolerancijos ribas nustatančiu formaliu kriterijumi galima laikyti tokius 
nukrypimus nuo normos (kaip idealių visuomeninės sistemos parametrų), ku-
riems esant ji dar gali normaliai (stabiliai) funkcionuoti. Kultūrinis egalitariz-
mas, reikalaujantis sulyginti daugumos ir diskriminuojamų mažumų teises, pa-
žeidžia būtinos įvairovės proporcijas ir todėl yra kvestionuotinas. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: egalitarizmas, tolerancijos paradoksas, tolerancijos ribos, 
būtinos disharmonijos konstanta. 
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